Chapman University

Chapman University Digital Commons
Philosophy Faculty Articles and Research

Philosophy

1981

Rights and the Meta-Ethics Of Professional
Morality
Mike W. Martin
Chapman University, mwmartin@chapman.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/philosophy_articles
Part of the Bioethics and Medical Ethics Commons, and the Ethics and Political Philosophy
Commons
Recommended Citation
Martin, Mike W. "Rights and the meta-ethics of professional morality." Ethics (1981): 619-625.
DOI:10.1086/292274

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Philosophy at Chapman University Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Philosophy Faculty Articles and Research by an authorized administrator of Chapman University Digital Commons. For more information, please
contact laughtin@chapman.edu.

Rights and the Meta-Ethics Of Professional Morality
Comments

This article was originally published in Ethics in 1981. DOI: 10.1086/292274
Copyright

University of Chicago Press

This article is available at Chapman University Digital Commons: http://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/philosophy_articles/3

AN EXCHANGE

ON PROFESSIONAL

MORALITY

Rights and the Meta-Ethics of
Professional Morality
Mike W. Martin
In "A Meta-Ethics for Professional Morality," Benjamin Freedman contends that professional morality requires deviations from what ordinary
morality prescribes.' Moreover, it is impossible, he avers, to provide a
deontological
justification for these professional norms. They must be
defended instead in terms of society's approval of the fanatical pursuit of
ideals by professionals. I will argue that Freedman's defense of these views
is inadequate. Using his own example of confidentiality, I will then illustrate the appropriate role that deontological considerations operating in
in justifying the special moral
rights-play
ordinary morality-namely,
norms of the professions.

I
Freedman develops his arguments using medical confidentiality as the
central illustration. His argument for why professional morality conflicts
with ordinary nonprofessional
morality may be set forth as follows. (1)
to
maintain
The obligation
confidentiality is a central tenet in the professional morality of physicians (as well as that of doctors, priests, engineers,
etc.). (2) Medical confidentiality differs in two respects from ordinary concovers all information given to the
fidentiality. First, it automatically
doctor as well as what the doctor discovers in the course of treatment,
without the need for ordinary explicit indicators by the patient that the
information is to be held confidential. Second, it is a much stronger moral
requirement than the ordinary moral requirement to maintain confidences. That is, the physician's obligation to maintain confidences can be
overridden only by reasons much more serious than those required to
override the ordinary obligation to maintain confidentiality on matters of
similar importance (pp. 2-3). (3) Hence, medical confidentiality licenses
different and sometimes contradictory conclusions from those of ordinary
confidentiality.
(4) Therefore, medical confidentiality and professional
morality license deviations from what ordinary morality prescribes: "On
the basis of professional morality we may arrive at a practical conclusion
not countenanced (in any straightforward way) by ordinary morality"
(p. 4).
1. Ethics 89 (1978): 1-19. Numbers in parentheses are page references to Freedman's
article.
Ethics 91 (July 1981): 619-625
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Premises 1 and 2 are true and lead to 3. As Freedman correctly points
out, appeal to best consequences is more readily allowed as justification
for breaking ordinary confidences than it is for medical confidences.
Without a patient's authorization a doctor cannot divulge even innocuous
medical facts unless very serious likely harm to the patient or others is
involved. The increased seriousness of medical confidentiality is formally
indicated by its protection by laws.
But 4 does not follow from 3. The mere fact that the medical confidentiality obligation requires acts conflicting with what the ordinary confidentiality obligation sanctions does not establish that professional morality justifies deviations from what ordinary morality prescribes (even
assuming that the medical obligation is, in fact, morally valid). For there
may well be other ordinary moral considerations which explain why the
medical obligation is stronger. These considerations, of course, will have
to take into account the circumstances of medical practice. In this sense,
they will be ordinary moral considerations applied to the special or 'nonordinary' context of professional dealings. I will argue later that moral
rights constitute just such considerations-that there are ordinary moral
rights which require especially strong reciprocal obligations when viewed
within the context of medical and other professional relationships.
Freedman's deceptive argument, we might note, is a type of composition fallacy having the following general construction:
One aspect of ordinary morality (e.g., the ordinary obligation to
maintain confidences) is not as strong as its analog in professional
morality (e.g., the professional obligation to maintain confidences).
In fact, the professional norm may license acts which violate its
analogous ordinary moral norm. Therefore, the system of professional morality sanctions departures from the system of ordinary
morality.
The fallacy lies in moving from claims about the relationships among
parts of the systems of professional and ordinary morality to claims about
the two systems themselves. It disregards the possibility of there being
other elements in ordinary morality which justify departures from the one
element under consideration.
II
Freedman presents two arguments against a deontological justification of
professional moral norms. Both of them are formulated against a specific
version of deontology which would ground these norms in a promise, a
version which I will refer to as the Promise View. The first argument is as
follows:
Given that professional ethics differs from and is in conflict with
ordinary

ethics, . . . by promising

to obey professional

morality,

one has promised to contravene ordinary morality; and a promise to
perform evil is traditionally regarded as either not binding at all or
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But the promise to adhere to
as deficient in its binding power....
professional morality is just such a promise to do evil from the very
outset, that is, a promise to accept an ordering of values different
from that afforded by nonprofessional morality. [P. 12]
The argument turns on conflating the very different notions of "contravening ordinary morality" and "doing evil." Throughout the essay,
Freedman uses the expression "ordinary morality" as a mere contrast for
"professional morality"; yet the contrast should be nonprofessional morality, or, better put, a morality considered apart from the specific moral
obligations of professionals. Given this usage, there is no warrant for
equating departures from ordinary moral obligations with doing evil in
the sense of acting immorally, but quite the contrary. Freedman himself
argues at length that such departures are justified. But if special professional responsibilities are justified, then the Promise View cannot be refuted by viewing the professional's promise as a vow to do evil.
The second argument is a reductio ad absurdum that begins by assuming (for the sake of argument) that a promise could justify adherence
to professional moral norms (pp. 12-13). Using a series of rhetorical
questions, Freedman claims that the promise to adhere to professional
norms will be overridden at every point where ordinary morality seriously
contradicts it; hence, ordinary and professional moral norms cannot seriously conflict. But it has already been established that they can, and
therefore the Promise View entails a falsehood and must be rejected.
As it stands, this argument again illicitly equates violations of ordinary obligations with wrongdoing. That is, without warrant it forces the
defender of the Promise View into viewing ordinary moral obligations as
stronger than (i.e., always overriding) professional obligations.
Nevertheless, the argument can be revised to make it more compelling. Instead of saying the promise would have to be overridden every time
it conflicted with ordinary obligations, Freedman should have said that
the Promise View provides no answer as to whether professional norms
ought to be overridden when they conflict with ordinary moral norms.
That is, for all the Promise View says, the obligation created by the
promise might be constrained at every juncture where it conflicts with
ordinary morality. Hence, the Promise View cannot by itself provide a
justification for professional obligations.
The point can be put even more straightforwardly. A mere promise to
abide by medical mores cannot justify those mores, for in general a promise cannot by itself justify abiding by any given set of mores. This is
because the mores, for all the promise says, may be unjustified on their
own merits and may sanction gross immorality. Taken by itself, the
Promise View is not even a serious candidate for justifying the content of
professional norms.
If Freedman had been clearer about why the Promise View should be
rejected, perhaps he would have cast about for alternative deontological
positions. Instead, he quickly generalizes that his two arguments cut
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against any deontological approach to justifying professional norms:
"For deontology, either the immorality [that professional norms may lead
to] is real-in which case one cannot bind oneself to it-or it is (merely)
apparent-in which case we do not have the requisite conflict" (p. 13).
This begs the question as to whether other deontological considerations,
such as rights, may be candidates for justifying professional norms, which
would then permit professionals to bind themselves to them by a promise,
oath, or the mere adoption of a particular social role. With respect to
confidentiality, one such candidate is well known: the patient's right to
privacy.
III
Having rejected deontological approaches, Freedman correctly dismisses
act-utilitarianism. The confidentiality obligation in both ordinary and
professional morality rules out as illegitimate the making of exceptions
every time the consequences of doing so seem slightly better. On the
surface, rule-utilitarianism is a much more plausible alternative. It asserts
that the rule of maintaining confidences promotes patients' trust and
hence their willingness to divulge private information relevant to their
therapy. Thereby, it serves to produce the good consequences of successful
therapy and good health.
Freedman is hesitant to adopt this familiar rule-utilitarian move. He
poses doubts as to whether ultimately it may be reducible to unacceptable
act-utilitarianism. More importantly, he questions whether there are good
reasons for thinking medical confidentiality does produce the maximal
good consequences even in terms of effectively protecting health. He thus
is led to offer a novel solution to the problem.
Professionals, he says, are fanatically committed to pursuing ideals
which help them achieve their central professional goals (at least, by their
view of means-to-end relations). Physicians, for example, are "zealots for
health" (p. 14). They subscribe to the ideal of primum non nocereabove all do no harm (to the patient)-so they emphasize confidentiality,
which they view as promoting successful therapy. W--, as the general
public, approve of at least some professional zealousness in pursuing such
ideals as promoting health, for we stand to gain by it in certain respects.
For this reason we recognize as legitimate the norms which enable professionals to achieve their ideals: "By our desire that physicians be zealots for
health, we must allow its corollaries" (p. 14).
This ingenious argument can serve as a psychological explanation
for why we countenance professionals operating by their own norms. But
it does not provide a moral justification of those norms. For it leaves
unanswered the question of whether our desires for professional zealousness are morally reasonable, all things considered. A rule-utilitarian, for
example, might respond that, insofar as there are doubts about whether a
given professional norm maximizes good consequences, the same doubts
carry over to whether the public's indulgence of the norms is rational. We
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may agree that "society ought to, and does, [sometimes] grant freedom to
those with fanatical adherence to an ideal" (p. 14). But when that ideal
comes into conflict with other ideals, some independent moral reasoning
might have to be invoked to resolve priorities. Freedman's Ideal Theory is
just like the Promise View in failing to provide moral justification for the
specific content and limits of professional obligations.
IV
It is time to sketch an alternative deontological approach for justifying
professional norms, focusing on the example of professional confidentiality in medicine. As already indicated, the appeal to rights, and in particular privacy rights, is familiar in this context,2 and one wonders why
Freedman failed to give it even passing mention. Perhaps it was owing to
what A. I. Melden recently called attention to as philosophers' general
preoccupation with 'oughts' and obligatory acts, to the neglect of rights.3
Engrossment with the fact that professionals acquire special moral obligations can lead one to exaggerate the differences between ordinary and
professional morality. The sole connection that Freedman notes is the
injunction in ordinary morality to honor acquired professional obligations (p. 6). But this tenuous link belies deeper interrelations deriving
from moral rights.
In any case, my concern is to illustrate how ordinary moral rightsbe invoked to explain
that is, rights operating in ordinary morality-can
both the role attachment and the special stringency of professional obligations. In addition, I will urge that only the notion of rights can do justice
to the felt personal nature of many of those obligations. For the confidentiality obligation is an obligation to a given patient (or penitent, employer, etc.) rather than some general obligation to society at large or to future
patients.
Let us begin by recalling several familiar cases of confidentiality,
some involving professional relationships, which derive from specific acts
of entering into a confidence rather than from roles. (a) A government
official entrusts me with secret information concerning a scientific project
I am pursuing. He would never find out that it was I who revealed the
information to foreign spies, and hence I may not bring harmful consequences to him, but my act might have dangerous ramifications for national security. (b) My boss reveals to me in confidence the details of our
company's new bid. If I pass this information on to our competitors I will
be undermining his authority, insulting him by failing to respond to the
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confidence he placed in my honesty, and doing harm to the company. (c)
A close friend confides in me that he is having serious marital difficulties.
Broadcasting this about the neighborhood
would violate and perhaps
destroy our friendship. (d) A colleague nearing the tenure decision confides in me that he is unhappy with his work and is sending out his
resume without telling the college administrators. If I told the administrators, I would be showing utter disrespect for a colleague as well as
possibly influencing negatively the tenure decision.
Freedman says at one point that, beyond its frequent good consequences, much of the value of confidentiality lies in its intrinsic worth as
an "immediate affirmation of a particular kind of human relationship"
viz., the relationship of trust (p. 13). The cases illustrate this, but also
indicate how relationships of trust may be embedded within contexts involving other sorts of valued relationships: loyalty to country, respect for
legitimate authority, friendship, mutual respect among colleagues. The
cases can also be used to illustrate how the person who confides the
information has special authority to decide whether it shall be passed on,
an authority explained by ascribing a moral right to determine that the
information remain confidential. In the last two cases the right is specifically a right to have personal information kept private within boundaries
set by the person himself. The friend and the colleague have the right to
have the information kept confidential when revealed with that understanding. The first two cases involve the rights of the government representative and the employer to decide who shall have access to important
government or company information.
Consider now the obligation of professionals, doctors in particular,
to maintain confidentiality.
We need to answer three questions: (1) Why
do special obligations of confidentiality become attached to professional
roles, such as that of being a physician? That is, why do the obligations
apply to all information of a certain type obtained in the course of functioning in that role without the need for any explicit requests for confidentiality by patients? (2) Why are professional obligations of confidentiality more binding and forceful than ordinary ones, where information
of similar importance is involved? (3) Why is the confidentiality obligation owed to specific individuals, such as the specific patient, rather than
to the general public or merely to future patients who must be able to trust
the doctor? The answer to all these questions is that patients have special
rights to have their medical information kept confidential, and their general rights to privacy have special importance in the medical context.
A number of considerations combine to make the right to privacy
have special force in the medical context and apply to all medical information. (a) Medical information is often extremely personal, especially
psychiatric information. If there is any area where a person has a right to
determine what shall be revealed to whom, it is here. (b) The patient is in
an especially vulnerable position with respect to the doctor upon whom
he or she must rely for help. There are special needs for safeguards to
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protect the patient. (c) The patient's health and life is at stake in being
able to openly convey information to the doctor without an inhibiting
anxiety that the information may be misused. (d) There is always
uncertainty as to how medical information may be misused. Because of its
general importance, only a general ban on revealing it can maximally
protect patients' rights. (e) The doctor is providing a service which the
patient pays for directly or through insurance (and pays dearly!). The
transaction of information involved is part of the service, which the patient has a right to control within limits.
V

There remains space for only three final comments. First, no right is
absolute in the sense that it cannot be overridden by other moral considerations. In particular, the right of a patient to confidentiality will at times
have to give way to considerations of greater public good. Second, there is
no question that if doctors freely divulged personal information about
patients medical practice would then be harmed. The loss of trust would
lead patients to be wary of divulging highly personal information to
doctors, even though the information was directly germane to restoring
their health. But the fact that such rule-utilitarian considerations play
some role in justifying medical confidentiality does not preclude other
deontological justifications. We need only note that the patients would
lose trust because they saw how doctors disregarded their moral rights.
Third, the invocation of particular rights always carries with it an ad
hoc air until they are grounded in fundamental human rights. I believe
the privacy right can be given a grounding in the basic right of an agent to
pursue his or her legitimate interests. The right to confidence owned by a
patient, penitent, defendant, or employer, vis-a-vis a physician, priest,
lawyer, or employed engineer, is grounded in the agent's right to freely
pursue legitimate affairs. The details of showing this would require
another occasion, but I believe the argument can be worked out along the
same lines Melden uses in Rights and Persons to ground the right bestowed by a promise.
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